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Abstract   
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European Com-
mercial law and Alternative Dispute Resolution at the International Hellenic University. 
For decades, academics and practitioners unsuccessfully try to unravel the mysterious 
password to the non-signatories issue in arbitration. To the date, the only solution so 
far proposed by current practice is a traditional concept of consent based on the appli-
cation of contractual theories and general principles. However, the current commercial 
reality develops new sophisticated business forms that cannot be covered by such an 
elementary approach resulting in a chaotic decision-making (the so-called “legal 
creativism”) based on efficiency and fairness to the detriment of consent in the sense of 
its replacement. 
Does this mean that a traditional concept of consent to arbitrate has been modified un-
der the influence of the arbitration transforming process? Is it really necessary (im-
portant) to sign an arbitration agreement at all? Does this mean that accepted contrac-
tual theories are pure legal fictions based on none of consent at all?  If so, could a ju-
risdictional consideration based on a concept of dispute be an alternative solution to 
the problem? This work attempts to analyze the aforesaid trends and determine wheth-
er the “out of the box” thinking could be a practical remedy to the problem in the era of 
cosmopolitan arbitration? 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor Profes-
sor Peter Gottwald for his significant contribution to my thesis with his invaluable sup-
port and advices that led me to the right way. 
On a more personal level, I want to express my gratitude to my family for their uncondi-
tional support and love as well as a constant inspiration during my studies in Greece. 
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Preface 
This dissertation is written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European Commer-
cial Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution at the International Hellenic University. It is 
a modest contribution to the ongoing discussion on the issue of necessity to reconsider 
the settled contractual approach of consent to arbitrate as regards non-signatories to-
wards the concept of dispute. 
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Introduction 
Perhaps when readers hear again and again the magic collocation of “non-
signatories in arbitration” undoubtedly, it grates on the ear to listen to the repetition. 
However, it is truly hoped that the present thesis could be a modest contribution to 
the global process of turning of the juristic “orthodox river of thinking” to the main-
stream of the demands of contemporary business world and thus, to the promising 
future of arbitration as a truly cosmopolitan system of dispute resolution. 
A. Back to basics 
 We have to admit that relying on the principle of privity of contracts, the discussion 
on the issue for decades was remaining exclusively concentrated on the framework 
of good old contract law ignoring the effect of arbitration agreement. Therefore, the 
“face-control regime” to the arbitration club based on evidence of (traditionally formal) 
consent exclusively. However, current business creates new, previously unknown 
forms that challenge arbitration to its (traditional) limits and cannot be explained by 
pure philosophy of traditional commerce of the Middle ages. In order to remedy the 
problem arbitration community, attempting to put “effects of arbitration agreement” 
into contractual regulation, started to “invent” new methods based on equity and fac-
tual circumstances rather than on consent as such that resulted in blurring of notion 
of consent and even its exclusion. For instance, France, being among the most liber-
al (if not innovative) jurisdictions, interprets the content of arbitration clause in a way 
that it makes possible to bind not only entities or state-owned companies1 but even 
sovereign states2. Moreover, the main idea that lies behind such philosophy (of 
course on case by case basis) is performance3 (in relation to the main contract) that 
                                                     
1
  See for instance, Paris, 17 February 2011, Government of Pakistan v Dallah. 
2
  See for example, Cass. 1st Civil Chamber, 29 June 2011, Papillon Group v Syrian Arab 
Republic. 
3
 Paris, 7 December 1994, "Jaguar" case; Paris, 5 May 2011, Kosa v Rhodia; Paris, 26 Feb-
ruary 2013, n° 12-12953, SARL Lola fleurs v Société Monceau fleurs et autres.  
Additionally, in general third party could be also involved into proceedings through the so-
called “transmission”  that has to do with situations (by law or agreement) in which the main 
contract, that includes the arbitration agreement, is the subject of a transfer to another party. 
In this case, such arbitration agreement, being a separate from the whole economy of the 
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“replaces” the traditional formal expression of consent to arbitration. For instance, 
although 4the Swiss law is quite reluctant to the arbitration proceedings with a non-
signatory element, the “legal fate” of the latter much depends on a role that a non-
signatory played in the main contract, namely: direct  involvement in the performance 
of a contract, substantial participation in the negotiation without sign the contract5, as 
well as transfer of rights6. By contrast, among common jurisdictions England adheres 
quite strict formal approach and “retains a touch of conservatism”7 as to the fact that 
“there must be positive acts that clearly establish the non-signatory's intent to accede 
to the contract and also the original parties acceptance of that accession”8, whereas 
in USA Courts, on the ground of general principles of contract law9 and agency, 
                                                                                                                                                        
main contract, binds  successors  irrespective of whether the assignment  is valid  itself. See 
Cass. 1st Civil Chamber, 28 May 2002, CIMAT v SCA.  
As case law shows there is variety of facts under which  arbitration agreement, in terms of the 
main contract, was transferred, including  situations of “receivables transfers” as well as 
“chains of contracts”. In this regard See Paris, 10 September 2003, no. 2002/05034) and 
(Cass. 1st Civil Chamber, 27 March 2007; Cass. 1st Civil Chamber, 17 November 2010, 
Refcomp v Axa) respectively.  
4
 Joining non-signatories to an arbitration, Practical Law Article 6-275-4952 (2014).Available 
at: http://www.stornellocorrerolaw.com/documents/Joining-non-signatories-to-an-
arbitration.pdf  
5
 (According to the view of French Courts  such involvement may assume that the party’s in-
tention to the main contract  was to bound  the non-signatory to arbitration clause” (Paris, 7 
December 1994, V 2000 case, Rev. arb. 1996 p. 245, note E. Gaillard; Paris, 21 October 
1983, Dow Chemical, Rev. arb. 1984 p. 9) 
6
 ( the arbitration clause is automatically transferred as an accessory to the substantive rights 
transferred, regardless of the homogenous or heterogeneous character of the different con-
tracts involved (Cass. civ. 1re, 27 March 2007, ABS case, Bulletin 2007 I.129) 
7
 Meyniel, Alexandre,"That Which Must Not Be Named: Rationalizing the Denial of U.S. 
Courts With Respect to the Group of Companies Doctrine." The Arbitration Brief 3, no. 1 
(2013): 18-55. 
8
 Mayer, Pierre. "The Extension of the Arbitration Clause to Non-Signatories - The Irreconcil-
able Positions of French and English Courts." American University International Law Review 
27 no. 4 (2012): 831-836. 
9
  “However, as it is suggested there is a need for “integrating the five theories (incorporation 
by reference, assumption, agency, alter ego, estoppel) defined in Thomson(See Thomson-
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developed a kind of far-reaching methods that “gone well beyond seminal 
consensual predicate”10… to the extent of “more generic and unified theory”11 based 
on the principle of good faith with, however, lack of predictability as regards 
procedure as well as a legal outcome. Furthermore, so liberal “attitude” towards 
arbitration became to the point of development of the so-called “presumption of 
arbitrability”, holding that it is “applicable when the arbitration clause is broadly 
drafted”12 as well as “the most minimal indication of the parties' intent to arbitrate 
must be given full effect…in international disputes”13. In a word, all this legal chaos, 
that results in a significant legal uncertainty worldwide, was highly criticized by 
commentators to the extent of abandonment of  such theories as equitable estoppel 
as well as the theory of group of companies14. All in all, a reasonable person would 
wonder whether the difference of approach really matters at the time of global trade 
and so, a cosmopolitan arbitration. 
B. “Creative legalism” 
Unsurprisingly, this justice, that is called among commentators as “creative legal-
ism”15, results in a legal chaos, that is to say, decisions of courts and arbitrators differ 
                                                                                                                                                        
CSF,S.A.v American Arbitration Ass’n,64F.3d 773,776(2d Cir 1995).In a word, the court did 
not accept the said theories as being sufficient to recognize the fact that the parent company 
is bound by arbitration agreement signed by its subsidiary) into a comprehensive standard to 
be uniformly applied in determining the arbitrability of non-signatories”. See Martinez-Fraga, 
Pedro J.,"The American Influences on International Commercial Arbitration",Cambridge Uni-
versity Press,2009 at 158. 
10
 See, Meyniel, supra note 7, 23 et seq. 
11
 Id. 
12
 United Steelworkers of Am.v.Warrior&Gulf N.Co.,363 U.S. 574,582-83 (1960), available at  
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/363/574 
13
 Republic of Nicaragua, 937 F.2d at 478, available at   
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/937/469/192868/ 
14
 Thomas Aubrey L., Nonsignatories in arbitration: a good-faith analysis,14 Lewis &Clark Law 
Review(2010). 
15
  Youssef K.,"The Limits of Consent" The Right or Obligation to Arbitrate of Non-Signatories 
in Group of Companies, in B. Hanotiau and E. Schwartz (Eds.), Multiparty Arbitration, Dossi-
ers of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, No.7, 2010, pp. 71-109 
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from one jurisdiction to the other; moreover, even the same jurisdiction could come 
up with contradictory legal outcome that, in the end, jeopardise  “...basic compliance 
with the New York Convention” in the sense of successful enforcement.16 And it is 
not  obviously because of traditionally different philosophy of substantive law be-
tween jurisdictions, rather due to the constant change of the normative approaches 
by jurisdictions17 in the quest for a practical (if not unified in terms of harmonization) 
solution. 
C. “At the crossway of the roads” 
Although some scholars consider the latter metamorphosis as a mere modification of 
the consent (in contrast to its traditional meaning)  in relation to the contemporary 
approach based on the puzzle of facts, quite recently the other camp of commenta-
tors has insisted on the jurisdictional consideration of the issue towards the dimen-
sion of concept of dispute regardless of consent as such. To be more precise, in-
stead of creating of the so-called legal magic via contractual theories based on “an 
artificial interpretation of the will of parties”18, there is a proposal of more liberal ap-
proach based on the “level” of significance of the third parties' relationship to the dis-
pute at hand. To this end, if applicable set of theories worldwide is not a satisfactory 
solution as well as the notion of consent to arbitrate outgrew its original scope, there-
fore, we might or accept the transformed form of the consent according to the mod-
                                                     
16
 See Platte M., “An Arbitrator's Duty to Render Enforceable Awards”, 20 Journal of Interna-
tional Arbitration (2003, no. 3) p. 307 at p. 308 
17
  In a word, after Dow award, which “discovered” the group of companies doctrine, French 
courts drastically changed their view as to the “existence of an economic group” element in 
defining a consent. See for instance, the Pau Court of Appeal, 26 November 1986, Rev. Arb. 
(1988) p. 154.  
In a nutshell, the Paris Court of Appeal shifted focus to the involvement in the main contract 
including arbitration agreement, regardless of the existence of a “réalité économique unique”. 
Moreover,  the notion of “involvement” within time significantly differ from case to case, for 
instance, in some cases it was considered  “as a mere indice of consent”, while others cases 
justified the jurisdiction of arbitrators on involvement as  prima facie evidence exclusively. 
18 Gravel S. ,Peterson P., French law and arbitration clauses-Distinguishing scope from valid-
ity: comment on ICC Case n 6519 Final award,(1992)37 McGill L.J. 510 
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ern business needs and continue to suffer from  perpetual “legal chaos” in this matter 
or to re-think and acknowledge the fact that perhaps the bone of contention lies not 
on the consent itself but on the wrong interpretation of factual circumstances that, as 
a matter of fact, relate to the dispute itself rather than reflect consent as such.  
D. Purpose and Structure of this thesis 
Taking into consideration the aforesaid, this paper attempts to analyze the paradox of 
non-signatories issue in terms of encouraging discussion as to the consideration the 
problem through the jurisdictional filter that leads to the following central questions: 
With regard to the case law, does the traditional set of theories really “confess” the 
idea of consent? If the answer is negative, then what alternatives are available? 
Among others, as presumption, is it possible to refuse the traditional approach of 
consent to arbitration, as a contractual derivative, in favour of dispute that, through 
the certain set of facts, link all true parties to the dispute?  
This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter I analysis the whole way of the men-
tioned metamorphosis of consent to date through the prism of the ongoing transfor-
mation of arbitration and its influence on decision-making as regards non-signatories 
element. In particular, we will examine the reasons that are used by courts and arbi-
trators as justification of allowance of non-signatories to arbitrate.  
Further Chapter II will proceed with more thorough analysis of the decision making 
on the example of the most illustrative cases in terms of application of theory of equi-
table estoppel and the doctrine of group of companies as the main “components of 
the process of legal creativism” as well as the most contradictory approaches in rela-
tion to non-signatories. 
Eventually, besides the conclusions (Chapter IV), Chapter III in brief will address the 
previous attempts to remedy the problem as well as, under jurisdictional viewpoint, 
discusses the recent proposals in terms of concept of dispute and the IBA-type 
guidelines as being the first reaction of the arbitration community towards acknowl-
edging the necessity in harmonising approach to the issue at stake.  
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I. Consent: still disunity of essence 
 “How puzzling all these changes are!  
I'm never sure what I'm going to be, from one minute to another.” 
             (Lewis Carrol, Alice in Wonderland)  
A. Academic battles: durable past v. promising future 
To begin with, the mentioned statement clearly reflects the current situation on the 
scene of non-signatory in arbitration in the sense that under the same circumstances, 
decision, regarding the involvement of non-signatories in arbitration, will be antipodal 
depending on our understanding of the notion of arbitration. In other words, the legal 
fate of non-signatories depends on how exactly we (i.e. Courts, arbitrators in a cer-
tain jurisdiction) consider the scope of the arbitration agreement or to rephrase, to 
what “party” we are members. 
To be more precise, such a phenomenon on the theoretical level according to Dr 
Blessing19 could be explained by distinguishing of two types20 of academic views, 
namely, “mercatorists” and “non-mercatorists21”. Simply put, the standpoint based on 
                                                     
19
 Blessing M., The Arbitration agreement- Its multifold Critical Aspects, A.S.A.Special Series 
N8,19 (December 1994) at 18 
20
 In other words, “while one school favours a stricter approach relying predominantly on na-
tional laws, the other is more lenient, allowing extension based on principles such as bona 
fides, lex mercatoria or other principles of private international law”- Habegger Ph.,Extention 
of arbitration agreements to nonsignatories and requirements of form, ASA Bulletin, Vol. 22(2) 
2004, 398 at 404.  
21 It is worth noting that the “nationalists” are also divided amongst themselves in four groups: 
“the first argues that the law governing the arbitration agreement rules, as extension pertains, 
to the proper construction of the arbitration agreement and its validity. The second claims that 
the law applicable to the “extension” depends on the particular doctrine invoked. The third 
states that the validation principle is in order to give effect to an arbitration agreement vis-a-
vis a third party if such extension is secured under either the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement  or the law governing the parties’ underlying relationship. And finally, the fourth is 
in favour of the application of the lex loci executionis.” See Wahab Mohamed S.Abdel, "Ex-
tension of arbitration agreement to third parties: A never ending legal quest through the spa-
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the idea of understanding of arbitration nature (in other words, it is more about con-
tract or about dispute). Therefore, it is possible to distinguish a formalistic view (i.e. 
that considers arbitration agreement strictly as a derivative of contract law) and a 
“liberal” one (i.e. Here arbitration agreement is considered on the basis of a jurisdic-
tional nature of arbitration).  
However, the former presented by Professor Sandrock22 the so-called “traditional ap-
proach”23, based on a pure substantive contract law that seek to use “definite, time-
tested national rules”, as the only legal tool to the issue at stake, “does not consider 
whether this is suited to the consensual nature of arbitration and dismisses any 
transnational or a national dimension to the problem”24.  
B. “Juristic magic”: in quest for consent somewhere between equity and 
conduct 
As regards the application of general principles of contract (national) law, the latter 
“results in a basis of jurisdiction embodying various degrees of consent,25 depending 
on the applicable method that, as practice shows, “seems to focus as much on equi-
table considerations after the conclusion of the contract as on discerning the intent of 
the parties ex ante”26 as well as on the factual actions of non-signatories.  Therefore, 
in reality arbitrators face with the issue of consent in terms of its elusive (i.e. equita-
ble considerations) or functional nature (that does not correspond with the normal 
                                                                                                                                                        
tial-temporal continuum," in Conflict of Laws in International Arbitration 137 (F. Ferrari & S. 
Kroll eds., Sellier International Publishers, 2010). 
22
 Sandrock O., Arbitration Agreements and Groups of Companies, in: Festschrift Pierre La-
live, Basel, Frankfurt a.M. 1993, at 625 et seq. http://www.trans-lex.org/116200/  
23
 Hosking James M., The Third Party Non-Signatory's Ability to Compel International Com-
mercial Arbitration: Doing Justice without Destroying Consent , 4 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. Iss. 
3 (2004). Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol4/iss3/6   
24
 Fouchard, Gaillard&Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration par 1443 et seq (Gail-
lard&Savage eds.,1999) 
25
 See Hosking, supra note 23. 
26
 Rubins N., “Group of Companies Doctrine and the New York Convention” in Emmanuel 
GAILLARD and Domenico DI PIETRO, eds., Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and In-
ternational Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice (Cameron May 2008) at p. 
460. 
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way of whether parties concluded an arbitration agreement) as a basis for presumed, 
abstract consent in terms of so-called “implied” consent as well as “consent by con-
duct”. One may say that in a way it is a kind of “artificial legal facts” that mostly exist 
in “mind” rather than in fact. In other words, arbitrators are like magicians27 who 
transform the “idea” into life in a form of certain legal facts. Therefore, it seems that 
the latter is a consequence of inability of classical approach to resolve modern com-
plex arbitrations. 
C. Notion of transformation: from “eco zone” to “biome” 
Although it is traditionally presumed that “consent is the touchstone of jurisdictional 
assessment in complex arbitrations28, however, according to professor Capper29 “in 
the transition that we have seen over the last decade,…it is already changing in 
ways…” that do not necessarily based on the consensus30 merely due to the fact 
that, to say the truth  31“…business people in this world are not agreeing to national 
concepts, baggage-laden ideas of arbitration informed by the litigation practices of 
history and geography which is the eco zone32 way of looking at systems…”; there-
fore we have”…to face up the fact that international commercial arbitration has out-
                                                     
27 However, in order to “minimize” the uncertainty, arbitrators, in particular ,”should consider 
the following variables collectively: the factual matrix of the case at hand, overriding transna-
tional norms and trade usages utilized in the context of international arbitration, and the pre-
vailing norms under the law governing arbitration agreement, lex loci arbitri and lex loci 
executionis if possibly determinable and reconcilable.”See Wahab, supra note 21 at 180 et 
seq. 
28
 Hanotiau B.,Non-signatories in international arbitration: lessons from thirty years of case 
law in ICCA Congress Series, n°13, 2007, 341. 
29
 Capper Philip, Arbitration: just what are the parties agreeing to? the Worshipful company of 
arbitrators, the master's lecture 2009. Available at: 
http://www.arbitratorscompany.org/speechesAnnualLecture.php  
30
  Id. ,“I am denying the survival of the predominance of the agreement of the parties, the 
consensual basis, as the answer to almost everything in international commercial arbitration 
because it is not even true today…” 
31
 Id. 
32
  Id. It is used as metaphor holding that ”eco zones are the way we divide up the world by 
history and geography”.  
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stripped national, historical, regional baggage into a new biome…”33 where, in partic-
ular, “the exclusive rule of consent has faded”34to the extent of its negation (or even 
exclusion)35 towards “economies of the transaction in mind...as self-standing ele-
ments that feed...(directly) the decision to extend or not to extend.”36 Such a position 
has been explicitly declared by one of the ICC awards: “… [T]he question whether 
persons not named in an agreement can take advantage of an arbitration clause in-
corporated therein is a matter which must be decided on a case-to-case basis, re-
quiring a close analysis of the circumstances in which the agreement was made, the 
corporate and practical relationship existing on one side and known to those on the 
other side of the bargain, the actual or presumed intention of the parties as regards 
rights of non-signatories to participate in the arbitration agreement, and the extent to 
which and the circumstances under which non-signatories subsequently became in-
volved in the performance of the agreement and in the dispute arising from it.” In oth-
er words, the ground on which tribunals assume their jurisdiction over non-
signatories is no longer a consent itself but the puzzle of facts (the so-called among 
scholars “factual matrix”) towards dispute before the tribunal, “taking into considera-
tion the usages of international trade and well-established arbitral practices37”. 
Jurisdictional arsenal: règle de raison  
Such transformation in determination of consent has been called among commenta-
tors as a règle de raison (a rule of reason) which Hanotiau rephrased via “what –if-
not” case explaining that “a good test to decide whether an ‘extension’ of the clause 
is appropriate is to determine whether the same solution would be justified if the situ-
                                                     
33
 Id. “biomes are the way we divide up the world by a community of commonality of similar 
characteristics; and that is what…international commercial arbitration is growing into…a 
largerly unitary system” 
34
  See Youssef, supra note 15. 
35
 However, “All individual elements of a case will have to be weighted very carefully, respect-
ing the basic principle of the privity of contract and the clear notion that legal entities are dis-
tinct from each other and that, therefore, such fundamental principles cannot easily be re-
moved by an arbitral tribunal unless very specific circumstances demand such a removal.” 
See Blessing M., supra note 19. 
36
 See Youssef, supra note 15. 
37 See Wahab, supra note 21. 
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ation were reversed”38. Further, it should be noted that such a “reasonable justice”, 
under concrete facts based on the principle of equity and good faith itself,… “likely to 
be far more important to the outcome than which theory of law is advanced”39.  
In this respect USA Courts went even farther in the sense of rendering decisions  rel-
atively “in the name of equity”40 under the framework of “presumption of arbitrability”, 
whereas French Courts developed the principle of “involvement in performance” al-
lowing a non-signatory to participate in arbitration proceedings to the extent “… so 
that all legal and economic aspects of the dispute are brought before the arbitrator”. 
For instance, in a Westland case with an element of a non-signatory State,arbitrators, 
even directly mentioned the “equity choice” resumed that “ the practical reasons and 
considerations of equity…have motivated the arbitrators in this matter, quite apart 
from the legal ground.”41 Therefore (in contrast to the consideration of arbitration on 
                                                     
38
 See Hanotiau, supra note 28. 
39
 Id. 
40
 “...when the corporate form is used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud.” Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. 
Government of Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 2006). 
41
 ICC Case No. 3879, Interim award of 5 March 1984, Yearbook XI (1986) p. 127 at p. 132.    
The facts are as follows: “On 29 April 1975, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar 
and Egypt concluded a treaty by which they established the Arab Organization for Industriali-
zation (AOI). On 27 February 1978, AOI and Westland signed a Shareholders Agreement for 
the establishment of a joint stock company, (ABH). The ABH was to be the legal base for 
manufacturing and selling “Lynx” helicopters developed by Westland. The Agreement con-
tained an arbitration clause referring all disputes to ICC arbitration in Geneva…Later on the 
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar withdrew from the AOI agreement as of 1 July 
1979 and declared that a committee would be established to liquidate the organization's as-
sets. Egypt opposed this decision and announced its intention to keep the AOI in existence in 
the form of a company governed by Egyptian law (“eaoi ”). In July 1979, Westland took note 
of the fact that its contractual counterpart had been dissolved and, on 12 May 1980, it filed a 
request for ICC arbitration against AOI, the four Member States and ABH as respond-
ents…The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar did not participate in the arbitral proceedings.”- 
Westland Helicopters v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, The Arab Organization for Industrializa-
tion and others, Tribunal Fédéral [Supreme Court], 19 July 1988 in Albert Jan van den Berg 
(ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1991 - Volume XVI, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, 
Volume 16 Kluwer Law International 1991, pp. 174 – 181- 
 All in all, the final award was rendered  by Swiss tribunal against AOI and 3 remaining States 
on the ground that “an arbitration agreement could be extended to the non-party states if the 
economic interdependence between the states and the company is evident and if the actions 
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the contractual  basis) we may say about jurisdictional dimension that, as a matter of 
fact, is  an origin of arbitration, which is not a logic based on the set of legal rules (the 
classic understanding of the legal system), “but...a process of reaching a decision 
which is essentially pragmatic, utilitarian or even at times, regrettably, arbitrary”.42  
      With regard to the aforesaid, we may conclude that, eventually,  in order to ren-
der the enforceable award, arbitrators and courts in the first place attempt to trans-
form43 the equity or economic reasons (de facto) into acceptable (logically by jurisdic-
tion of enforcement) legal tool (de jure) in terms of applicable theories such as estop-
pel, l'apparence, doctrine of group of companies etc. Moreover, with such a logic in 
mind it is possible to assume that such a “legal magic” is a kind of legal trick that, in 
the absence of real consent, formally covers the core tribunal's issue of jurisdiction 
based on consent, on the one hand. On the other hand, according to the view of Ha-
notiau44, there is no any anomaly due to the fact that we should speak not about the 
breadth of the arbitration agreement, but rather about the true parties to it in the 
sense of new modern approach to the notion of consent, which like a chameleon, 
changes its form and content according to circumstances of a complex reality. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the States intended to be bound by the contract including the arbitration agreement”- Join-
ing non-signatories to an arbitration, Practical Law Article 6-275-4952 (2014).Available 
at:http://www.stornellocorrerolaw.com/documents/Joining-non-signatories-to-an-arbitration.pdf   
42
 Oppetit Bruno, Theorie de l'Arbitrage, 1. éd. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1998, 
pp. 125-126. 
43
 In this regard Hanotiau noted: “One is occasionally tempted to wonder whether equity is not 
in some cases the paramount consideration and all the legal theories advanced to justify the 
tribunal decision, ex post facto creation.” Hanotiau Bernard, 'Problems Raised by Complex 
Arbitrations Involving Multiple Contracts—Parties—Issues An Analysis' (2001) 18 Journal of 
International Arbitration, Issue 3, pp. 251–360 
44
 Hanotiau Bernard, Consent to Arbitration: do we share a common vision?, Arbitration Inter-
national, 2011, p. 539. 
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II. Contractual theories and consent: chameleon effect  
“Fragmentation is an artifact that may involve both risks and opportunities” 
J. P. Trachtman, The future of international law, Cambridge 2013 
As we may see from the previous discussion, arbitrators' and courts' decisions not 
always and obviously funded on consent in its traditional meaning; moreover, as 
case law shows in order to define the so-called “common intention” between parties 
and non-signatories to the arbitration agreement, courts and tribunals, occasionally, 
even forced out of facts that normally is not allowed to the extent that decision-
making process went more far out of the scope of arbitration clause maintaining the 
sophisticated “manipulations of law and facts”45 in a form of “legal magic” that creates 
significant misconceptions46 as to the correct interpretation of the factual background 
and the whole legal outcome of the issue at hand.  
Moreover, as practice shows decision making will be never limited by the formal 
scope of the arbitration agreement if justice required otherwise in terms of equity, 
fairness and efficiency. However, in any case, such “a legal freedom” in relation to 
consent must be justified by certain legal form, that, as a matter of fact, drastically 
differ among jurisdictions in terms of “forms” of consent, its interpretation and a man-
ner of expression. Therefore, taking into consideration complexities of the issue as 
well as space constrains the present Chapter attempts to analyze the said phenome-
non as regards the limits of the scope of the arbitration clause de jure and its inter-
pretation in practice de facto in relation to consent to arbitrate via brief analysis of the 
theory of equitable estoppel and the doctrine of group of companies. Put simply, are 
we talking about the metamorphosis effect of consent in the context of the transfor-
mation of arbitration?  If the answer is positive, then perhaps there is no any consent 
at all? Is there any sense to sign an arbitration agreement at all? If so, is this an im-
passe or there are other alternatives?  
Despite the fact that arbitration faced its first “troubles” in relation to non-signatories  
since 70's, the “load is there until this very day”. The decisive philosophy  to the issue 
                                                     
45
 In a word, it has to do with the famous case Dallah v Government of Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 
46 and previously in the Peterson Farms v C&M Farming, [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 603. Both 
cases will be discussed further in this paper. 
46
 Id. 
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lies on the ground of desperate range of theories and legal presumptions, namely: 
(1)alter ego/piercing the corporate veil,(2)incorporation by reference, (3)assumption, 
(4)agency, (5)third-party beneficiary, and (6) equitable estoppel47 among which  legal 
literature, in general, distinguishes two groups of theories in relation to non-
signatories. In particular, to rephrase Hanotiau48 “…the jurisdiction of arbitrators 
based either on the ground of equity and fairness or transmission”. Moreover, 
Brekoulakis49 distinguishes the first group based on the equitable (not consensual) 
principle of good faith, whereas the second group is rooted in a determination of the 
consent by conduct. The “good faith” is represented by such theories as alter ego, 
agency and equitable estoppel, while the “consent by conduct” is defined by the fol-
lowing theories: assignment or transfer of rights, the third-party beneficiary and the 
group of companies’ doctrine. 
A. Good faith 
To begin with, “the concept of good faith in contractual dealings is pervasive in both 
common law and civil law systems”50. It has to be noted that “in civil law systems, 
good faith is the first and most accepted principle in the interpretation of consent”51. 
The latter could be interpreted in a few ways: firstly, on the ground of presumption of 
reverse situation (by analyzing the content and conduct) as if such a dispute arises  
with participation of reasonable “men” in the first place; secondly, execution of justice 
in its the most general meaning in the sense of rendering simply a “just” decision.  As 
regards the latter, in other words, the tribunal “… may look at each party’s action, re-
spectively, for violations of the duty of good faith and decide whether the non-
signatory must arbitrate based on what justice requires to re-balance the equities be-
tween two parties.”52   
                                                     
47
 Williams E.Dwayne, Binding Non-signatories to arbitration Agreements,25 FRANCHISE 
L.J.(2006) at 176 
48
 See Hanotiau, supra note 44. 
49
 See Capper, supra note 29. 
50
 Thomas, supra note 14. 
51
 See Fouchard, supra note 24. 
52
 See Thomas, supra note 14. 
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The described process of “birth” of justice under the umbrella of the theory of equita-
ble estoppel is discussed below. 
Estoppel  
 
To put simply, the main philosophy of the principle of estoppel lies in the equity and 
fairness and could be perfectly and simply described by the well-known adage “good 
guys should win and bad guys should lose”53. Moreover, the theory influenced the 
arbitrator's decision to the extent of negation of consent in the sense of “potential al-
ternative to consent” as a ground for legitimate arbitration. Following Oliver Wendell 
Holmes: “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience”54, further we 
will analyze such an experience in terms of relevant case law. To be more precise, 
the following line of cases illustrates decisions of arbitrators dealing with the issue of 
good faith (or its lack55) as a decisive argument in determining the legal fate of non-
signatory to arbitrate.  
                                                     
53
 Young Roger&Spitz Stephen, SUEM-Spitzs Ultimate Equitable Maxim: In Equity ,Good 
guys should win and bad guys should lose,55S.C.L.Rev.175,177(2003). 
 54 Holmes Oliver W., The common law 1 (Little,Brown &Co1938) 
55 For instance see Motorola Credit Corporation v. Uzan, 322 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2003), 
available at:http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/274/481/2493622/ Here 
Court did not envoke the estoppel in relation to Uzan family (defendants) as a non-signatory  
because “from the very outset... defendants have acted fraudulently...through inconsistencies, 
omissions, false representations, and tactical diversions”.  In a word, Court founded its deci-
sion on the basis of doctrine of “unclean hands”. This case is a brilliant example of the magi-
cal effect of the (reverse) good faith principle as regards non-signatory issue that is twofold: 
on the one hand, violation the duty of good faith precludes the non-signatory from arbitration 
benefits, whereas the behavior in good faith may be the lucky gateway to arbitration. As the 
Court of Appeals has noted, "[t]his case raises a host of unusual [legal] questions...Further 
“...all the credible evidence before the Court proves that the defendants in particular, the 
members of the Uzan family ,have perpetrated a huge fraud. Under the guise of obtaining 
financing for a Turkish telecommunications company, the Uzans have siphoned more than a 
billion dollars of plaintiffs' money into their own pockets and into the coffers of other entities 
they control. Having fraudulently induced the loans, they have sought to advance and conceal 
their scheme through an almost endless series of lies, threats, and chicanery, including, 
among much else, filing false criminal charges against high level American and Finnish ex-
ecutives, grossly diluting and weakening the collateral for the loans, and repeatedly disobey-
ing the orders of this Court.”  
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The simple search for the true intent of the parties derives directly from the rule of 
interpretation in good faith56. In a word, the legitimacy of such equitable outcome 
highly depends on “how much support there is in the facts and the law...”57, further-
more, “the latter define the extent to which the arbitrators would need to depart from 
their duty to render an enforceable award in order to reach the intended outcome”58 
in a name of justice based on the fragile interconnection between “economic and 
moral values”59. 
It has to be noted that the term Arbitral estoppel60presumes two following theories: 
the direct benefit estoppel61 and the closely intertwined  estoppel62. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 One more example of the application of good faith (i.e. lack of it by conduct) In Gorlach v. 
Sports Club Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71 (2009)  US courts have denied the enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement that was included in an employee handbook, but never specifically 
signed by the employee. In fact, the court rejected arguments that the agreement was en-
forceable under theories of equitable estoppel or implied-in-fact agreement. It was not enough 
for the arbitration agreement to be placed in the handbook. The employee must sign the arbi-
tration agreement for the provision to be enforceable. Cited at California lawyer 
http://www.callawyer.com/2015/12/arbitration-update-an-overview-of-recent-california-
appellate-decisions/   
56
 See Fouchard, supra note 24. 
57
 See Youssef, supra note 15. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Chafee Z., Jr.Foreword to selected essays on equity (1955), cited in Anenson, T. Leigh, 
From Theory to Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel Under a Pluralistic Model of Law. 
Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2007. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1013103   
60
 “Derived from the ancient French “estouper” and still yet used in the sense of “to plug” as 
for holes in a vessel. See Le Grand Robert de la Langue Francaise (Alain Rey ed.2001), in 
English translation as “to stop””. Cited in Park William, Non-signatories and International Con-
tracts: An Arbitrator’s Dilemma, in Multiple Party Actions in International Arbitration 3 (2009); 
adapted from Non-Signatories and International Arbitration, Leading Arbitrators' Guide to In-
ternational Arbitration 553 (L. Newman & R. Hill, 2nd ed. 2008).Available at:  
http://www.williamwpark.com/publications.htm 
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In a nutshell, under the theory of the Direct benefit estoppel a non-signatory may be 
compelled to arbitrate on the ground of certain benefit from the contract at hand. 
Moreover, a non-signatory can benefit from the terms of the contract even without 
explicit participation in its “conclusion, performance and termination”.63 For Instance,  
in Deloitte case, two international associations DHSI and TRI merged globally. The 
main agreement contained the relevant arbitration clause. In fact, affiliates of the 
DHSI had to accept the deal by signing the copy of the said agreement or to object to 
it upon receipt. However, the Noraudit (a non-signatory), a regional affiliate of DHSI, 
neither signed nor raised the objections to the agreement while continuing to use the 
international DHSI's trademark “Deloitte”. The nuance of the merger laid on the fact 
that the further use of the mentioned trademark of the DHSI's affiliates was strictly 
conditional upon the acceptance of the said agreement. Consequently, the DHSI 
sought to compel Noraudit to arbitration on the ground of the agreement at issue. All 
in all, taking into account the aforesaid, and the fact that “Noraudit knew of the arbi-
tration agreement and "knowingly accepted the benefits of" that agreement through 
its continuing use of the name "Deloitte"64, the Court stopped Noraudit from arguing it 
was not bound by the arbitration clause in the agreement.  
In the American Bureau of Shipping v Tencara Shipyard65 non-signatories, being 
Owners of the yacht, were compelled to arbitration on the ground of direct benefit 
from the contract at issue. In brief, a group of investors (Owners/insurers) entered 
into a construction (to construct a yacht) contract with Tencara. In turn, Tencara, un-
der the terms of the contract, entered into a contract with ABS to obtain a vessel 
classification for the yacht. Due to the defects of the yacht investors filed the lawsuit 
against Tencara while Tencara brought suit against ABS. In a word, the arbitration 
clause, in terms of contract between Tencara and ABS, was incorporated into the 
certificate of classification. After all, the Court of Appeals endorsed the decision of 
first instance as to the “compelling arbitration of claims between Tencara and ABS 
                                                                                                                                                        
62
 See for instance Sunkist Soft Drinks Inc v Sunkist Growers, Inc.,10 F 3d 753,757-58(11
th
 
Cir 1993), cert denied 115 S.Ct. 190 (1994) 
63
 See Meyniel,supra note 7. 
64 Id. 
65
 American Bureau of Shipping v Tencara Shipyard Nos. 98-7823(L), 98-7893(XAP). 
Available at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1022586.html  
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and extended it to the investors claim as well”66 on the ground that  investors re-
ceived a “direct benefit” from the contract (Interim Certificate of Classification) without 
which registration would have been practically impossible in the form of lower insur-
ance rates and the ability to sail under the French flag67. 
Moreover, in a recent case In re: Lloyd’s Register North America68 the Fifth Circuit 
granted a writ of mandamus to enforce a forum selection clause requiring London 
disposition of a dispute between (LRNA) a classification society and a ship purchaser 
(Pearl Seas). In a nutshell, “Pearl Seas contracted with Irving Shipbuilding, Inc. (Ir-
ving) for the construction of a ship. LRNA was responsible for certifying the ship. 
Pearl Seas was dissatisfied with the ship and engaged in several years of arbitration 
and litigation with Irving. Upon the conclusion of those proceedings, Pearl Seas 
brought suit against LRNA. LRNA moved to dismiss the suit for forum non 
conveniens, alleging that a forum-selection clause… required Pearl Seas to bring its 
claims in England. All in all, the Fifth Circuit held the forum selection clause in the 
contract between Irving and LRNA applied to non-signatory Pearl Seas through the 
doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel, because  firstly, Pearl Seas knew about the con-
tent of the contract between LRNA and Irving well before the instant litigation, sec-
ondly, Pearl Seas acted to exploit that contract through actively attempting to enforce 
                                                     
66 See, Hosking, supra note 23. 
67 American Bureau of Shipping v Tencara Shipyard Nos. 98-7823(L), 98-7893(XAP). Avail-
able at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1022586.html 
68 Lloyd’s Register North America, Incorporated, No. 14-20554, 2015 WL 791405 (5th Cir. 
Feb. 24, 2015) 
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those terms that benefitted it and finally, Pearl Seas gained a direct benefit69 from 
LRNA’s performance of the contract’s terms.”70  
Regarding the theory of closely intertwined estoppel, a non-signatory will be involved 
(or even compelled) to arbitration “if the non-signatories claims are closely inter-
twined with the underlying contract and the entities involved share a close relation-
ship”71. For example, in International Paper Company v. Schwabedissen Maschinen 
& Anlagen GmbH72 “buyer of industrial saw was precluded from asserting that, as a 
non-signatory party, it was not bound by the arbitration clause included in the con-
tract for the sale of the saw between distributor and manufacturer, when the buyer's 
claims against manufacturer were based on and arose out of that contract”73. Taking 
into account the fact that a buyer, being a non-signatory to the main contract be-
tween distributor and manufacturer “clearly does seek a "direct benefit" from the con-
tract and makes a "claim. . . integrally related to" that contract ...,that provides part of 
                                                     
69 By contrast, in Belzberg v Verus Invs Holdings Inc, 21 NY 3d 626 (2013), a securities bro-
ker (Jefferies) brought an arbitration against its customer (Verus) to recover expenses regard-
ing the withholding taxes. Verus sought to imply in arbitration certain third-party claims 
against several individuals for their shares of the taxes as well. Among those was the so-
called Belzberg who did not sign the SAA (securities account agreement), including an arbi-
tration clause. After all, the New York Court of Appeals held:”where the benefits are merely 
indirect, a non-signatory cannot be compelled to arbitrate...therefore, Belzberg derived bene-
fits from the financial advisory services he provided to another party but not directly from the 
Jefferies-Verus SAA”.  
70 See Lloyd’s Register North America, supra note 68. 
71
 See Meyniel,supra note 7. 
72
 “The question presented to us is whether an arbitration clause in the distributor-
manufacturer contract requires the buyer, a non-signatory to that contract, to arbitrate its 
claims against the manufacturer. The district court held that it did. Concluding that the buyer 
cannot sue to enforce the guarantees and warranties of the distributor-manufacturer contract 
without complying with its arbitration provision, we affirm. The arbitration clause is a broad 
one, requiring arbitration of " [a]ny dispute arising out of the Contract." International Paper 
Company v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen Gmbh, 206 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2000), 
available at: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/206/411/597981/     
73
Brekoulakis S., Third parties in International commercial arbitration (1
st
 edn.Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2010) 
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the factual foundation for every claim of non-signatory”74; therefore, Court held that 
“the buyer cannot sue to enforce the guarantees and warranties of the distributor-
manufacturer contract without complying with its arbitration provision.”75  
However, as this world is imperfect the same applies to the application of the theory 
of estoppel that also creates certain difficulties (if not a legal chaos) by applying a 
rule of the lex mercatoria”76 or the factual conduct. 
For instance, in famous Bridas S. A. P. I. C. v. Government of Turkmenistan77 
Bridas78 entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) to exploit oil and gas resources 
with an entity (Turkmenneft)79 “designated by the Government of Turkmenistan. All in 
all, the Government ordered to halt operations in Keimir and cease making imports 
into and exports from Turkmenistan. Consequently, Bridas commenced an arbitration 
proceeding, as provided in the JVA, against the Government and Turkmenneft. Im-
portantly, the Government decreed that all proceeds from oil and gas exports in the 
country were to be directed to a special State Oil and Gas Development Fund;  the 
fund's assets were declared immune from seizure. As a result, the tribunal held that 
the Government was a proper party to the arbitration and that the tribunal had the 
authority to adjudicate Bridas's dispute with the Government. The tribunal held both 
Turkmenneft and the Government liable for repudiating the JVA.”80 In its findings US 
Court explicitly held that actions of the government are fundamentally unfair81 and 
                                                     
74
 See International Paper,supra note 72. 
75
 Id. 
76
 See Fouchard, supra note 24.  
77
  BRIDAS v Government of Turkmenistan, No. 04-20842, Apr 21, 2006, Available at: 
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-5th-circuit/1089023.html  
78 an Argentine corporation 
79
   The “Turkmenian Party” to the agreement has been an entity wholly owned by the Gov-
ernment, whose identity was designated and re-designated at will by the President of Turk-
menistan and has changed a number of times during the life of the joint venture.  
Turkmenneft is the last entity to step into the role of “Turkmenian Party.”   
80
 See, BRIDAS, supra note 77. 
81
“…there is ample evidence that ...Turkmenistan misused Turkmenneft to harm Bridas by 
destroying the value of the joint venture Agreement.When the Government dissolved the 
Turkmenian party and replaced it with Turkmenneft, Turkmenneft was capitalized  with the 
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especially in relation to its manipulation over the subsidiary. Moreover, the Court de-
termined “fundamental unfairness” in a situation “when a parent corporation diverted 
income from the undercapitalized subsidiary to itself, and therefore, piercing the cor-
porate veil was appropriate”82. Otherwise Bridas with almost no chances would try its 
fate before the local courts of Turkmenistan where the success of the former is out of 
the question. However, this decision faced quite a strong criticism. In particular, pro-
fessor Smith noted that “it was on the basis of a doctrine foreign to Turkmenistan's 
legal tradition that… Court not only held the government bound by contractual 
obligations it had not assumed, but also exercised its jurisdiction over a (non-
signatory) on the basis of arbitration clause it did not agree to”83.  
Furthermore, the application of  the so-called “two-prong” or hybrid test84, that results 
in decision-making  tendency, based exclusively on the integral relationship between 
signatories and a non-signatory, with explicit elimination of the significance of con-
sent to the extent, as Hosking noted, of “… undermin (ing) consent” as the keystone 
of arbitration”85. 
 All in all, such a liberal approach is an organic element of extensive interpretation of 
arbitration agreement for the sake of fairness and efficiency as “after all, how is it that 
                                                                                                                                                        
equivalent of only $17,000 US and was funded by a State oil and Gas Development Fund 
expressly rendered immune from swizure under newly enacted Turkmenian law.Yet 
Turkmenneft became the party bound to arbitrate under the JVA and liable for any adverse 
award.At the same time, the Government a number of decrees distancing itself from the joint 
venture and attempting to limit its potential exposure to liability. The Government’s manipula-
tion of Turkmenneft to prevent Bridas from recovering any substantial damage award satisfies 
the “fraud or injustice” prong”. Id. 
82
 Id.  
83
 Smit H., When is a Government bound by a contract, including an arbitration clause, it did 
not sign?,16 AM.Rev.Intl ARB.323(2005), cited in Hanotiau B. "The Issue of Non-Signatory 
States" ,23 The American Review of International Arbitration (2012 Nos. 3-4), available at 
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/articles.html      
84
   Cases McBro Planning &Dev cov Triangle Elec.Constr.Co., Sunkist Soft Drinks v Sunkist 
Growers 
85
 See Hosking, supra note 23 at 530. 
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the claimant could ever receive a fair outcome when he has to arbitrate part of his 
claim and then go to court against another part of the same dispute”86. 
Therefore, some general conclusions can be drawn: 
- Firstly, the theory of equitable estoppel based on principles of equity that has 
nothing to do with contract law  in terms of  traditional understanding of the 
notion of consent. On the contrary, case law based on  a “totality of circum-
stances” test87 that consists of “relationship test ” with not universal effect88. 
Therefore, the issue of legal certainty, procedural efficiency and predictability 
of legal outcome is at stake. 
- Secondly, if we insist that the fundament of arbitration is consent with its 
source of contract law, then it seems quite illogically to apply non-consensual 
methods to remedy the “consensual” deal (arbitration agreement). However, 
the latter facilitates the decision-making process by providing the adequate in-
terpretation89 of the arbitration agreement in a non-default situations90 “by an-
alyzing what a reasonable person in the party situation would believe the 
                                                     
86
 DeArman J., Comment, Resolving Arbitration's Nonsignatory Issue:  A Critical Analysis of 
the Application of Equitable Estoppel in Alabama Courts, 29 Cumb. L.Rev. 645 (1998-1999) 
87
 Martinez-Fraga, Pedro J.,"The American Influences on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion",Cambridge University Press,2009 
88
 In fact it results in rendering of contradictory decisions under the same set of facts. 
89
 “Although general principles of interpretation of intent exist, national laws provide very dif-
ferent solutions to key questions, such as: What are the acceptable forms of expression of 
consent? What are the rules which govern the interpretation of arbitration agreements? Are 
these rules different from the rules which govern contractual interpretation in general? And 
finally, what are the conditions and scope of application of third-party principles to contracts in 
general, and to arbitration agreements, in particular? See Youssef, supra note 15. 
90
 “A signatory may be compelled to arbitrate with  a non-signatory if, in good faith, the signa-
tory intended to grant that right to more than just the other signatory.”/Sourcing Unlimited, 
Inc.v.Asimco, Inc.,526 F.3d 38,48(1
st
 Cir.2008), 
Equally, “a nonsignatory may be compelled to arbitrate with a  signatory if the nonsignatory's 
actions during negotiations of the contract signal its intent to be bound by the promise to arbi-
trate made by another party”/Intl Paper Co.v.Schwabedissen Maschinen &Anlagen GMBH, 
206 F.3d 411, 416-18 (4
th
 Cir.2000) 
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breadth of the arbitration clause should be”91 in the sense of determination of 
the true parties to the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, by application of 
the principle of good faith through estoppel arbitrators exercise the highest 
and major goal of the arbitration (as being a “private” but justice anyway) eq-
uity and balancing the legal positions of the parties as “When one party vio-
lates the duty of good faith, there is never the possibility of finding any other 
intent besides self-interest92, and most often, the bad actor will resist  any 
venue the innocent party chooses in an attempt to avoid being held account-
able”. To rephrase, tribunals, in  the absence of the relevant contractual in-
struments (due to the rudimentary structure of legal theories) and in order to 
execute the mission of formal justice, “dress” facts in the content of equity but 
in the shape of (abstract) consent according to the traditionally accepted can-
ons. 
- Finally, there is clear huge inconsistency as to the application of the principle 
Lex Mercatoria in the sense of the mentioned issue of differentiation between 
“mercatorists” and “non-mercatorists”. In other words, if for France application 
of the said principle on the position of transnational law ( i.e.arbitration) is a 
”piece of cake ”,  case law of England, Germany or Switzerland pursues the 
traditional approach in terms of prevailing of national law that in the end 
seems to be a destructive factor. 
B.  Decoding the code of conduct  
The second set of theories that is used in relation to non-signatories is so-called 
“consent by conduct” and generally speaking, is represented by the following theories 
such as: the third party beneficiary, assignment or transfer of rights and the group of 
companies’ doctrine.  
Remarkably, the consent under those theories is defined by the actions which, and 
that is most important, are related to the main contract exclusively (not to the arbitra-
                                                     
91
 Bonell M.J., An international restatement of contract law: The UNIDROIT principles of inter-
national commercial contracts 142(3d ed., 2005), cited in SeeThomas A., supra note 14. 
92
 Transrol Navegacao S.A.782 F.Supp.848 (S.D.N.Y.1991):“A bad actor should not be able 
to injure an innocent party through their contractual relations and then shout “lack of consent!” 
in order to avoid the venue of recovery that the innocent party may choose: arbitration or liti-
gation”. Cited in Thomas,A., supra note 14.  
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tion agreement at stake as it should be presumed). Further, here it is possible to ad-
mit a kind of anomaly in the sense that the level of requirements of the consent to be 
defined by application of such theories is relatively lower in contrast to the consent 
between parties to the main contract in the first place. Furthermore, for instance, tak-
ing into account the findings of the Polish Supreme Court (in case regarding assign-
ment)93, it is important to note that the consent was recognized on the basis of the 
analysis of  the content of arbitration agreement regardless of the parties to it. Put 
simply, “the scope ratione personae of the arbitration agreement is determined by 
reference to its scope ratione materiae”94. In a word, such findings correspond to the 
recent solution proposed by professor Brekoulakis, that will be discussed further.  
The more detailed analysis of the aforementioned will be presented by one of the 
most contradictory (in practice) theory, the theory of group of companies. 
                                                     
93
 In 1992 RPPD SA entered into an agreement with P. sp. z o.o.in W. The agreement in-
cluded an arbitration clause as well as a clause providing that P. sp. z o.o. in W could transfer 
all of its rights and obligations under the agreement to another company upon notice to RPPD 
SA but without the consent of RPPD SA. By letter signed by one person who was the CEO of 
both P. sp. z o.o. in the city of W. and P. sp. z o.o. in the city of R., RPPD SA was notified that 
the rights and obligations under the 1992 agreement had been transferred from P. sp. z o.o. 
in W. to P. sp. z o.o. in R. The letterhead referred to P. sp. z o.o. in W., but the stamp under 
the CEO’s signature referred to P. sp. z o.o. in R. P. sp. z o.o. in R. filed an arbitration claim 
against RPPD SA. RPPD SA sought to dismiss the claim on the grounds that there was no 
arbitration clause because the rights and obligations under the agreement had not been effec-
tively transferred  from P. sp. z o.o. in W. to P. sp. z o.o. in R. The arbitration court overruled 
the objection to its jurisdiction and RPPD SA thereafter refused to participate in the proceed-
ing before the arbitration court. See Polish Supreme Court, 3 September 1998, I CKN 822/97. 
Summary available at: http://arbitration-
poland.com/caselaw/475,polish_supreme_court_judgment_dated_3_september_192_97.html  
The Court founded its decision on Art. 698(2) of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure which re-
quires that arbitration agreement shall specify the subject of the dispute or at least a legal re-
lation resulting in a dispute, or a potential dispute. 
94
 See Youssef, supra note 15. 
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French “nightmare”- Group of companies' doctrine 
 “Even in the context of arbitration agreement it is not always the case that the con-
cepts of separate legal personality of corporate entities and  
privity of contract are sacrosanct”.  
James and Ridgeon, Norton Rose Fulbright95, 2014 
Despite the fact that there are two diametrically opposed points of view and there is a 
huge literature as regards the phenomenon of this doctrine, it is worth noting that the 
group of companies' doctrine is one of the most extravagant (if not extreme) 
approaches among arbitration community that has come a long way96 from  
                                                     
95
 Hong Kong office, Norton Rose Fulbright-2014, International Arbitration report, issue 3.  
96
 For instance,  in Jj Ryan Sons Inc v. Rhone Poulenc Textile Sa -863 F. 2d 315 (1988), 
available at: http://openjurist.org/863/f2d/315/jj-ryan-sons-inc-v-rhone-poulenc-textile-sa , 
“Ryan brought tort and contract claims against Rhone and fourt of its foreign affiliates arising 
out of the importation of products manufactured by Rhone’s affiliates.Ryan had no contractual 
relations with Rhone; however, it had entered into several contracts with Rhone 
affiliates.While the distribution contract between Ryan and Rhone affiliates contained 
arbitration clauses, the other agreements did not. All in all, the trial court ordered arbitration of 
the principal claims against affiliates under all the contracts notwithstanding the absence  of 
arbitration clause in those contracts.”- Cited in AAA, Handbook on commercial arbitration, 
Juris Net; 2 edition, ed. by Carbonneau T., Jaeggi J.A. , (September 30, 2010), 500, at 43.     
The fourt circuit affirmed the decision holding that “although the contracts did not contain 
arbitration provisions,they implemented the distribution agreement that did contain an 
arbitration provision...as without the ancilarry agreements pertaining to the details of actual 
importation of the affiliates’ products, the exclusive distribution agreements would be largely 
illusory. Further, Court of Appeals affirmed the decision holding that  “When the charges 
against a parent company and its subsidiary are based on the same facts and are inherently 
inseparable, a court may refer claims against the parent to arbitration even though the parent 
is not formally a party to the arbitration agreement.” In a word, the decision  based on the find-
ings of the Fifth Circuit  back to 1976 in case  Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Company v. S.A. 
Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir.1976) where Court held:  "If the parent corporation was 
forced to try the case, the arbitration proceedings would be rendered meaningless and the 
federal policy in favor of arbitration effectively thwarted", whereas in  Sahrank v Oracle 
Corporation, Docket No. 02-9383, 2005, Available at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-
circuit/1476967.html, Court of Appeal declined to enforce an arbitral award against  a corpo-
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acknowledgement as agreate legal discovery to the extent of disillusion in terms of 
total negation as a practical tool97. Likewise, perhaps this is the only theory that, due 
                                                                                                                                                        
rate parent where there was “no clear and unmistacable intent  by (it) to arbitrate”/Cited in 
Zuberbuhler T., Non-signatories and consensus to arbitrate,26 ASA BULLETIN 1 /2008 
(Mars). 
97
For instance, in Peterson Farms Inc. vs. C&M Farming Ltd. (judgment of 4 February 2004, 
[2004] EWHC 121 as regards application of the theory of group of companies where the Eng-
lish Commercial Court set aside an arbitral award rendered in London in which the “group of 
companies” doctrine had been applied to grant damages to entities of the C& M Farming Ltd 
group which were not named as parties to the sales agreement which contained an ICC arbi-
tration clause. The law applicable to the sales agreement were the laws of Arkansas, USA 
and the place of arbitration was London. In brief, C&M, the purchaser and Peterson, the sell-
er, concluded a sale contract. The contract provided for ICC arbitration and for the application 
of the law of Arkansas. Under the agreement, the C&M was sold male “grandparent” birds. It 
mated the birds to produce “parent” males which it would sell on as hatching eggs or day-old 
chicks to other “group entities” and to other purchasers. The other group entities used the 
parent males to breed with parent females to produce broiler chicks. It transpired that the 
poultry was infected with an avian virus. Consequently, C&M  initiated arbitration. One of the 
issues for the Tribunal was whether it had jurisdiction to consider and determine the damage 
claims of other entities within the C&M's group which were not named as parties to the 
agreement. Following the Dow, tribunal  recognize the group of companies on the ground of 
“the record of correspondence between the parties and internal documents of Peterson, the 
preliminary documents exchanged between the parties, and the general nature of the poultry 
business demonstrate that Peterson intended to enter into and perform under a contract with 
all the entities forming the C& M Group of companies. Peterson knew that it was contracting 
with a group as a whole and that its product would be used in an integrated operation that 
involved all members of the C& M Group. The tribunal considers that C& M is fully entitled to 
claim all damages suffered by the C& M Group and arising out of the contractual relationship 
with Peterson. However, Court set aside that part of the award which awarded payment of 
losses suffered by C& M Group members which were not party to the arbitration due to the 
fact that  as Langley J held:“English law treats the issue  as one subject to the chosen proper 
law of the agreement and that excludes the doctrine which forms no part of English law”. 
Cited in Alvarez H., Chapter 6: Autonomy of International Arbitration Process in Julian D. M. 
Lew and Loukas A. Mistelis (eds), Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration, Interna-
tional Arbitration Law Library, Volume 15, Kluwer Law International 2006, pp. 119 - 139 
Additionally,according to Hanotiau, the issue (raised by tribunal) of “pass-through claims” ‘is 
not specific to groups of companies and does not necessarily have to be decided on the basis 
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to its philosophy, instead of straight legal reasoning, gives possibility to arbitrators to 
create the so called “juristic magic” in the sense that “in many group scenarios, the 
extension...,on the basis of the will of the parties, is a fiction”98. Moreover, the latter 
takes place in decision-making as a result of mislead interpretation of the context of 
the doctrine original meaning. Further, we will discuss the aforesaid in correlation 
with the central issue of the thesis, as regards the existence of consent, in more 
detail. 
Although there is nothing new under the sun regarding the history of the doctrine, 
however, from the practical and methodological point of view, it is quite important to 
emphasize the following facts on the basis of which the doctrine became known in its 
current “appearance”: 
- The birth of the theory relates to the decision of French Court99 in a well-
known case Dow Chemical in 1982 that was a starting point ofthe vicious 
                                                                                                                                                        
of this doctrine. For example, it is not unusual for a main contractor to claim from the owner 
not only its own damages but also the damages suffered by its sub-contractors, which the 
main contractor has already indemnified. Whether this pass-through claim should be granted 
as such is function of the applicable law, which will most probably be the law applicable to the 
main agreement. Cited in Hanotiau B., Chapter 14: Groups of Companies in International Ar-
bitration in Julian D. M. Lew and Loukas A. Mistelis (eds), Pervasive Problems in International 
Arbitration, International Arbitration Law Library, Volume 15 Kluwer Law International 2006, 
pp. 279 – 290. 
All in all, as to the phenomenon of Peterson farms, Kaplan noted that  “Parisian courts at-
tempt to liberate international arbitration from national law”.  Schwartz added: “If you want to 
have a better chance of including a non-signatory in your arbitration, go to Paris. If you want 
to limit that possibility then select London.” Cited at  Commercial dispute resolution (2015) 
http://www.cdr-news.com/4980-a-tale-of-two-cities  
98
 See Gravel, supra note 18. 
99
Briefly speaking, the “group of companies doctrine” is often associated with French law be-
cause of the ICC Interim Award No. 4131 of 23 September 1982 ,Dow Chemicals v Isover 
Saint Gobain, available at: http://www.trans-lex.org/204131#head_2  Here Isover Saint Go-
bain concluded a few contracts with the subsidiaries of the Dow Group. At the moment of the 
dispute Dow Group aimed to commence arbitration due to the fact that Isover and one of the 
Dow subsidiaries signed the relevant arbitration clause in terms of a distribution agreement 
that specifically included the reference to subsidiaries of Dow in the sense that the latter are 
able to make delivery to Isover. The issue at stake concerned the jurisdiction over all subsidi-
aries at transaction. In this case tribunal established its jurisdiction on the following grounds: 
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circlee of cases100 "...where courts or tribunals can bind a non-signatory on 
the basis of that company's strings to, or parent/sibling relationship with 
another company...the result is that the court or tribune infers common 
intention of the parties on the basis of corporate structure and the active 
involvement of the non-signatory. This involvement is for example negotiation, 
performance, or termination of the contract containing the arbitration 
agreement.” 
-However, it is not fully correct to say (that is, unfortunately, overlooked in 
practice) that the Dow Chemical is a ground for creation of the doctrine of 
group of companies. Rather, it is a pure misinterpretation by arbitration com-
munity the real meaning of the original intention of the Court in its ruling that, 
in fact…”it is not so much the existence of a group that results in the various 
companies of the group being bound by the agreement signed by only one of 
them, but rather the fact that such was the true intention of the parties'.101  
- Moreover, as practice shows courts and tribunals determine “common inten-
tion to arbitrate” through the categories of “the group structure or the 
economic unit” of companies or on the ground of “active role of non-signatory 
in performance or termination of the main contract”. Further,  such application 
of conduct  “for substitute consent to arbitration  is  considered as a shortcut 
                                                                                                                                                        
there was an acknowledgement of the “single economic entity”, further, a parent company 
exercised absolute control over subsidiaries that signed the contract, next, one of the subsidi-
aries at issue performed the obligation, and finally, the common intention of all parties was 
therefore interpreted as the subsidiaries in transaction were bound by the main contract in the 
sense of being true parties to the latter. 
However, to the date concept in its original meaning is not recognised. The misbelief takes 
place merely due to the fact that France is considered as the most friendliest (if not innova-
tive) jurisdiction (that considers arbitration through its transnational notion) regarding the “ex-
tending” arbitration clauses to non-signatories. In fact, even in France the pure existence of a 
group of companies is not in itself a sufficient reason to extend arbitration agreement. Instead 
involvement or performance (according to the current (especially French) case law tenden-
cies) consider as a ground to allow participation of non-signatories in arbitration proceedings. 
100
 See, Brekoulakis, supra note 73. 
101
 See Fouchard, supra note 24. 
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permitting avoidance of rigorous legal reasoning”102that, as a result,  “...has 
contributed to a distorted approach by courts and arbitrators in a number of 
complex arbitrations”103 to the extent when “a notion of involvement in per-
formance per se replaces a search for consent.” Such a set of facts leads to 
the conclusion of Hanotiau that “involvement and knowledge have a standing 
on their own, as a substitute for consent.”104  
- The current business transactions became sophisticated to the extent of 
maintaining by courts their own reasoning over the notion of consent105. 
Next, regarding the consideration  of consent as contractual derivative, (assuming 
that the active role of a non-signatory in main contract could be evidence to be bound 
by this main contract), this, however, “would not necessarily reveal... intention to be 
bound by the arbitration agreement too ('arbitral intention').”106 107  In this respect, 
Dallah108is a brilliant example of a long-stay contention as to the way of decoding of 
conduct in terms of mentioned “camps” of the nature of arbitration. In a nutshell, 
Dallah109 “entered into a memorandum of understanding with the Pakistani Govern-
                                                     
102
  Hanotiau B.,Complex Arbitrations: Multiparty, Multicontract, Multi-Issue and Class Actions, 
Kluwer Law International, 2005 - Law - 392 pages, at 50 
103
 See Hanotiau, supra note 43. 
104
Id at 273. 
105 In this respect, case Khatib Petroleum Services International Co. v. Care Construction Co. 
and Care Services Co., is an exact example. Here the Egyptian Court maintained  its own 
reasoning as to the  extension in group of companies that according to the view of Youssef 
“pretend to be even more liberal approach than French ruling in a famous Dow case due to 
the fact that “Khatib does not refer to the parties' intentions, unlike Dow, which refers explicitly 
to the “common intentions of the parties” as the main basis for extension”. 
106
 See Brekoulakis, supra note 73. 
107
 For instance, the tribunal in ICC case no. 2138 of 1974 held "it is not at all certain that if 
the non-signatory had signed itself the contract [... ] it would have accepted the arbitration 
clause", in ICC awards 1974-1985 (Y. Derains and S. Jarvin), at p. 934. Cited in Brekoulakis, 
supra note 73. 
108
 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Gov-
ernment of Pakistan  
109
 The Saudi Arbian Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company 
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ment to provide accommodation for Pakistani pilgrims to the Mecca. Pakistan later 
established Trust to collect and invest the donations received from pilgrims for the 
project. Afterwards the Trust and Dallah entered into an agreement containing the 
terms which had been previously negotiated by Pakistan. The agreement also con-
tained an ICC arbitration clause. Due to the fact that Trust ceased to exist, a gov-
ernment official wrote to Dallah purporting to terminate the agreement. Dallah com-
menced ICC arbitration in Paris against Pakistan”110. The tribunal declared that ac-
cording to French111 international arbitration law Pakistan was bound by the arbitra-
tion clause as an alter ego of the Trust. However, the Dallah unsuccessfully tried to 
enforce the French award in England due to the fact that English courts did not rec-
ognize112 that Pakistan consented to arbitration. All in all, it has to be noted that in 
this case English and French Courts “searched” for consent through decoding the 
conduct of Pakistan on the ground of two irreconcilable views113: on the one hand, 
English position lies on the attempt to evidence the intent of Pakistan to be bound by 
the main contract in the sense that creation of the Trust was considered to the con-
trary as “indicative of an intent not to be bound by the contract (i.e. through the strict 
                                                     
110
Crivellaro J., CONFLICTING CONTRASTS IN DALLAH V GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN,  
 17 Colum. J. Eur. L. F. 51 (2011), available at : http://www.cjel.net/online/17_2-
crivellaro/#ftn1  
111
 (which it characterized as incorporating “the transnational general principles and usages 
reflecting the fundamental requirements of justice in international trade and the concept of 
good faith in international business”). Cited in “Dallah and the New York Convention”,G.Born, 
April 7, 2011, Kluwer Arbitration Blog. Available at: 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2011/04/07/dallah-and-the-new-york-convention/  
112 
The High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in November 2010 confirmed 
this view. 
113 “the UK Supreme Court devoted only passing attention to the fact that the Pakistani Gov-
ernment was actively involved in directing performance of the Agreement and formally termi-
nating the Agreement (again, in correspondence from Government officials on Government 
letterhead), while the Trust had not been involved at all in either performance or termination of 
the Agreement. In contrast, the Paris Court of Appeal placed substantial weight on all these 
circumstances, holding that the Government’s actions both before and after conclusion of the 
Agreement could only be explained by its status as a real party to the Agreement.” Cited in 
“Dallah and the New York Convention”,G.Born, April 7, 2011, Kluwer Arbitration Blog. Avail-
able at: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2011/04/07/dallah-and-the-new-york-convention/ 
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principle of privity of contracts).”114 115 On the other hand, French court concentrated 
on “the true party to the economic transaction,” and “in this light, the active-yet-
indirect role the government maintained throughout the contract (even despite the 
creation of the Trust), was sufficient to persuade the court of an intent to be bound by 
the arbitral provision (i.e. in relation to the effects of arbitration agreement).”116 
Moreover, from practical experience it is fair to say that in fact a non-signatory 
(regardless of the role) “might not even be aware of the arbitration agreement in the 
main contract”117 or in a worst case scenario, a non-signatory could not be aware 
about the fact that contract has been signed at all (very often it happens in situation 
when subsidiary enters into a contract on its own as a  separate legal entity but at the 
same time the latter maintains certain obligations for its parent company 
aknowledging the corectness on the basis of pure formal corporate structure)118 119. 
 In this regard position of French Court as to to the fact “..that a non-signatory party 
has taken part in the negotiation or the performance of the contract raises the 
presumption that the non-signatory party is aware of the existence and the scope of 
                                                     
114
 “The reluctance of English courts to consider precontractual negotiations – as contrasted 
to the approach in many other civil and common law jurisdictions – is familiar. Equally familiar 
is the English courts’ emphasis on express terms of contractual agreements and hesitations 
to embrace notions of good faith”. Cited in “Dallah and the New York Convention”,G.Born, 
April 7, 2011, Kluwer Arbitration Blog. Available at: 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2011/04/07/dallah-and-the-new-york-convention/ 
115
 See the analysis by Martinez, A., A tale of two judicatures, Int’l Arbitration Law Rev. N4 
(2011); Melanie Willems & Markus Esly, Dallah v Pakistan – French Courts Uphold the 
Award, 5 The Arbiter 3, 6 (2011). 
116 Id. 
117
 Id. 
118
 Born G.,International commercial arbitration 1154-1177, 2009. Cases that present misbe-
lief by contracting party as to who are the true parties to the agreement. In a word, in this re-
gard the so-called concept of  “piercing the corporate veil ”, that is rapidly applicable by USA 
Courts, very often replaces the issue of “extending”. However, it is fair to say that such appli-
cation is justifiable only in case when the shareholders hold 100 per cent of shares(de jure)  
and at the same time exercises the full control of the  transaction (de facto) in question in or-
der to commit a fraud  
119
 See Hanotiau, supra note 102. 
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the arbitration agreement included in this contract120seems incorrect if not absurd121. 
To this end, such a presumption is not “a lifebuoy”  in the sense that  “an arbitration 
agreement must be founded upon a meeting of minds of both the signatories and the 
non-signatories, which must be ascertained by reference to specific facts revealing 
                                                     
120
 the concrete actions of non-signatories raised such a belief regardless of the fact that the 
main contract has not been signed  at all. see for example Paris Cour d'appel, Nov. 30.1988, 
Korsnas Marna v Durand-Auzias (1989) REV. ARB. p. 691, with note Tschanz 208 and Paris 
Cour d' ,Appel, 7 Dec. 1994. Here a French Subsidiary of a Swedish company(Durand-
Auzias) started arbitration proceedings in Paris on the basis of a distribution contract that was 
originally concluded by the parent company of Durand-Auzias(Barkman) with Korsnas 
Marma(another Swedish company) including reference to the French subsidiary as its Paris 
office. Afterwards Durand-Auzias sued Korsnas Marma for an reimbursement. In its turn the 
latter argued as to the fact that French courts are lack of jurisdiction due to the existence of 
an arbitration clause. All in all, Courts concluded as to the contrary with the subsequent over-
ruling of the decision by Cour d’appel on the ground of the presumption of the fact that Du-
rand was aware of the arbitration clause and its meaning. Remarkably, with regard to the 
Dow, court in its ruling did not refer to the groupe de societies theory as well as the “direct 
reference to the volonte or intention of the parties and the emphasis on circumstances that 
would permit one to presume that the party which has not signed the contract was aware of 
the existence and meaning of arbitration clause”.See Gravel, supra note 18, at 524 et seq. 
 The relatively similar formulation is presented also by Orri v.Societe des Lubrifiants Elf-
Aquitaine, Paris 11Jan 1990,118 JDI 141. Here Mt Orri, a Saudi businessman, owned the 
SEL, a group of companies. Elf supplied certain products to the SEL regardless of the remain-
ing debts. As to the latter Mt Orri and Elf signed 2 documents: rescheduling of payments and 
a separate supply contract. The only first document was signed by Mr Orri. However the  sec-
ond document included an arbitration clause. At the moment of arbitration that has been 
commenced by Elf against SEL and Mr Orri, the latter argued that tribunal is lack of jurisdic-
tion due to the absence of Mr Orri’s signature on the supply contract. All in all, the argument 
was rejected and upheld by the Cour d’appeal as well on the ground that: “two contracts 
formed part of an indivisible ensemble as well as the fact that Mr Orri was the real counter-
party to the contract containing the arbitration clause;and finally, the groupe de societies the-
ory give rise to the treatment of Mr Ori as a party to the contract(in a word, the court went so 
far as to find that the substitution of the third party who signed the contract on behalf of SEL 
was a fraudulent act designed to shield Mr Orri from liability under the contract)”. Cited in 
Gravel, supra note 18, at 524 et seq. 
121
See Fouchard, supra note 24. 
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the mutual intention of the parties to resort to arbitration.”122 In this respect, we can 
find the relevant conclusion in ICC case 11405 of 2001. Here Two individuals (Mr T 
and Mr  G, CEO and General Manager of I) objected the jurisdiction of tribunal over 
themselves and company E (a non-signatory claimant)”123. I and C concluded a 
Share sale agreement (SSA) as to the incorporation of E by I with the  subsequent 
transfer of  E's shares to  C. Importantly, I was acting in its own name as well as in 
the name and on behalf of its shareholders, however, neither Mr T nor Mr G was not 
mentioned in agreement in terms of personal liability. Moreover, I and E concluded 
the other service agreement. Due to the fact that I stopped its operations, C and E 
commenced an arbitration by claiming damages against I, Mr T and Mr G as  “im-
plied” parties to the SSA on the ground that I was a major source of income for E. 
The arbitrator held:“What is relevant is whether all parties intended124 to be bound by 
the arbitration clause. Not only the signatory parties, but also the  non-signatory 
parties should have intended (or led the other parties to reasonably believe that they 
intended) to be bound by the arbitration clause”125. Moreover, the philosophy of the 
doctrine is so vague that it excludes any kind of manual, and therefore, may lead 
even to the incorrect legal outcomes. For instance, in ICC case n 6519126 Mr X, the 
controlling shareholder of  the French group of companies X, concluded a contract 
containing an arbitration clause with company Y, being a part of  the English  group 
of companies. Upon the agreement, Mr X and company Y had to transfer certain as-
sets to the French group of companies to company XB,  that was under the control of 
                                                     
122
 See Brekoulakis, supra note 73. 
123 See Hanotiau, supra note 102. 
124
 See Fouchard, supra note 24, at para 480: "It is equally inappropriate to resort to a general 
principle of interpretation in favorem validitatis or in favorem jurisdictionis, whereby arbitration 
agreements are to be interpreted extensively. Although it is true that arbitration is now a nor-
mal means of resolving disputes in international trade, and that arbitration agreements should 
therefore not be interpreted "restrictively" or "strictly, " it remains perfectly legitimate to choose 
to have one's international disputes settled by the courts. In this regard see also the so –
called principle of “effective interpretation of arbitration agreement” as well as the highly criti-
cized approach of the American courts towards “presumption in a favour of arbitration”. 
125
  As was pointed out by the sole arbitrator in ICC case no. 11405 of 2001.Cited in Hanotiau, 
supra note 102. 
126
 See Gravel, supra note 18. 
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Mr X. Further Company XB and XC which were controlled by Mr X,  were among 
those which shares were to be transferred to company XB as well. In a while, before 
the contract came into force, company Y withdrew from the joint venture. As a result, 
Mr X and companies XB, XC and XD started arbitration proceedings against Y as a 
consequence of such a withdrawal in terms of losses. The very question was as to 
the status of companies XC and XD in terms of “groupe de societes”. All in all, tribu-
nal rejected such a claim concluding the fact of mere disposition of shares by share-
holder. Moreover, the fact that Company XB, being a vehicle, in the sense that it 
received certain assets under the joint ventury agreement, merely support the idea of 
its status as a third party beneficiary, but not a party to the main contract with the 
relevant arbitration clause. In this case, neither “tribunals substitution...to “be directly 
concerned”, nor the Dow “test of involvement in performance” is not a solution as 
“each test is designed to lead to the conclusion that the company...was a party to the 
arbitration clause”. Further, in order to remedy the problem there are cases127 where 
the general principles of contract law are applicable as well in order to128“support the 
extension doctrines'...because the application of the traditional principles themselves” 
is  safe harbour  “under the factual circumstances of the case129”. However, it seems 
to be contradictory to apply the doctrine on the ground of (abstract) consent and at 
the same time “cover” the lack of facts  by the application of general principles by 
concluding “common intention”.  
After all, Gaillard’s phrase that "Visions are never wrong; they can be inoperative or 
internally inconsistent" perfectly describes the status of the doctrine. However, 
despite all pros and cons, the main finding is that, being merely “an orientation de la 
jurisprudence”130, it reveals the failure of the contractual approach on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, it simply reflects “increased” needs of the users of the system 
in terms of efficiency and regardless of consent in the sense that it does not “affect” it 
but overrides it. 
                                                     
127
 ICC award no. 1434 of 1975, (1976) JDI (Clunet) 978: ICC award no.5721 of 1990, (1990) 
117 JDJ (Clunet) 1029. Cited in Brekoulakis, supra note 73. 
128
 See Brekoulakis, supra note 73. 
129
 For example, the arbitral award in C&M Farming Ltd v Peterson Farms Inc. made specific 
reference to the agency theory in addition to the application of a `group of companies' doc-
trine. 
130
 See Gravel, supra note 18. 
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III. In the quest for a solution: from contractual “due process paranoia”131 to 
concept of dispute 
“Any system where diametrically opposed decisions can legally coexist cannot last 
long. It shocks the sense of rule of law or fairness. 
                                                                      Ultimately, there must be a right answer.” 
Goldhaber M.D.132 
Taking into consideration the fact that lack of efficiency and certainty is one of the 
major concerns among scholars and users of international commercial arbitrations, 
this chapter attempts to analyze the possibility to find practically  “more consistent, 
more inclusive and intellectually more honest approach to non-signatories”133. 
As can be seen from the analysis above current practice of the application of legal 
theories is more than imperfect. Instead of applying the certain legal reasoning arbi-
trators and courts are forced “to…unnecessary and incoherent formulations that ap-
parently serve only as obstacles”134.  Taking into account the view of Dr. Blessing 
who considers the possible solutions regarding non-signatories phenomenon as “the 
most delicate and critical aspects in international arbitration”135 further, we will briefly 
discuss solutions (past and recent) that attempt to change the situation drastically if 
not to evolve at all. It is truly hoped that as every disease has its specific treatment 
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International Arbitration Attorney Network, (2015)    https://www.international-arbitration-
attorney.com/2015-international-arbitration/  
132
Attrib.Blackaby, see Goldhaber M.D., Wanted: a world investment court, The American 
lawyer: Focus Europe, Summer 2004  
133
 Brekoulakis S.,  Parties in international arbitration: consent v commercial reality, confer-
ence 30th anniversary of the School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary, University of 
London, 19-21 April 2015, available at: 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/33775/queen-mary-professor-challenges-
thinking-consent/   
134
 Rau Alan S., Everything You Really Need to Know About "Separability" in Seventeen Sim-
ple Propositions, 14 American Review of International Arbitration 1 (2003). 
135
 See Blessing, supra note 19.  
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depending on symptoms, at least one of the solutions below, eventually, could be a 
proper and an effective remedy.  
A. General solutions136 - At first glance 
In the absence of harmonization and taking into consideration a high complexity and 
nonpredictability of the international business operations, one may suggest the 
obvious solution is quite simple, namely it is an obligation of parties, from the very 
beginning, to conclude a contract to the mere detail or to face the responsibility 
otherwise. Furthermore, if  the parties are not brave enough the “the safe-harbor” is 
too simple, to insert a clause explicitly negating any possible extension to third 
parties”137. However, and as any reasonable man could admit, such a kind of  an 
exaggerated pragmatism is not an adequate strategy from a practical point of view. 
Next, there is perfect option to execute the maxim Jura novit curia in the sense that 
arbitrators on the ground of consent of the parties and according to the certain 
arbitration rules will be able to exercise their jurisdiction regarding  a non-signatory 
involved in arbitration proceedings. However, such a mechanism reminds a kind of 
litigation procedure, thus, it might be questioned the legitimacy of the arbitrators 
jurisdiction on the ground of the said maxim as well as the mechanic  (without 
reasoning) “drugging” a non-signatory into arbitration.  
Further, with regard to the fact that law as such is rooted in justice based on equity, 
and “the fundamental principle of good faith entails searching for the common 
intention of the parties”138, and taking into consideration the fact that applicable by 
arbitrators theories  in most is the test of “good faith”, as an explicit manifestation of 
justice, it is quite reasonable, as a solution, to use the said principle in its large extent 
in terms of lex mercatoria or as a general transnational rule (as France does, for 
instance) that is universally independent form any national or international regime. 
Nonetheless, quite uncertain nature of Lex Mercatoria as well as the broad (if not a 
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morph due to jurisdictional factor) range of possible  situations involving non-
signatories, makes the realization of the idea in a framework of arbitration, relatively 
impossible. However, the realistic point of the proposal, in principle, could be raised 
in a distant future (upon acknowledgement of status of cosmopolitan arbitration) or, 
at least, on the ground of general contract harmonization, in a foreseen future. 
All in all, as we may see the aforesaid is not more than a theoretical idea of  a little 
practical value in terms of an adequate solution to the problem. One may say 
because of too trivial viewpoint that does not correspond with the notion of arbitration 
as such. And perhaps this is so as arbitration, unlike any other legal tool, is capable 
of being really a magical wand just depends on what hands it is (referring to the 
“mercatorists and non-mercatorists”). 
B. A hybrid approach 
With regard to the fact that, in general, the main outcome of the application of 
theories is an implied consent and taking back to the mentioned subject of “juristic 
magic”, one may suggest, as a remedy, to use the advantage of arbitration that, ac-
cording to Lord Wilberforce is not “a kind of appendix or poor relation to court pro-
ceedings”, but “a freestanding system, free to settle its own procedure and free to 
develop its own substantive law” in terms of creating the necessary instruments on its 
own through the jurisdiction of arbitrators. Furthermore, taking into consideration the 
fact that very often “lack of consent” in terms of application a certain theory in relation 
to non-signatories can be, under certain circumstances, tremendously detrimental, as 
well as the further complex issue regarding recognition of theories that has a strict 
jurisdictional constrains, it is possible to define the so-called hybrid approach139. Put 
simply, instead of suffering from lack of consent applying a separate theory or 
fabricate an implied (to the extent of illusion) consent or to be strong criticized to the 
extent of negation for the application too vague arbitration estoppel, or extreme 
theory of group of companies, arbitrators on a case by case basis could  chose and 
peak a few doctrines which suit to the factual bases of the dispute at hand. Remark-
ably, this progressive approach, as a matter of fact, is a “product” of already estab-
lished case law, therefore it is not just a pure theoretical fantasy. In fact, in mentioned  
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 Tang E., Methods to extend the scope of an arbitration agreement to third party non-
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case J.J Ryan & Sons v Rhone Poulenc Textile SA,140 the main argument of the 
plaintiff based not on the certain theory, but on the “procedural efficiency” consisting 
of a set of legal facts. 
Furthermore, in Copropriété Maritime Jules Verne et autres v. Société ABS American 
Bureau of Shipping et autre defendant applied four different theories in order to com-
pel the plaintiffs to arbitrate: agency, third-party beneficiary, involvement of the own-
ers in the performance of the classification agreement, and the doctrine of acces-
sory.141 In a word, as regards  the mentioned case  Bridas  v Government of Turk-
menistan  the claimant, in order to evidence that the government was bound by arbi-
tration clause signed by Turkmenneft, invoke almost the whole  non-signatory “arse-
nal” including such theories as agency, instrumentality, apparent authority, alter ego, 
third-party beneficiary and  theory of equitable estoppel. 
Moreover, Zuberbuhler back to 2008 proposed a general three-step method142 based 
on factual circumstances that consist of the following steps: firstly, determination of 
the (implied) consent of parties, secondly, in case of uncertainty of consent the issue 
of accountability is considered through the compelling a non-signatory on the ground 
of its fake impression to be bound, thirdly, facts are considered through the prism of 
fraud or abuse of rights of respective party. To rephrase the proposed method, 
broadly speaking, we may say about the following set of doctrines (in turn) doctrine of 
group of companies, alter ego and estoppel. Further, despite the fact that “attempt to 
identify… general rules very much remains a work in progress as the fact specific 
nature of the problem is its most prominent common element”143, hopefully, we are at 
the outset of quite revolutionary solution that will be discussed below. 
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C. Concept of dispute 
 
“I'm afraid I can't explain myself, sir.  
Because I am not myself, you see?” 
 Carrol, Alice in Wonderland 
At first sight, as we may conclude from the above discussion the light in a tunnel is 
not foreseeable due to the obstacle in terms of consent. However, consent is not a 
dogma which should be abandoned144. Rather, “the qualification of arbitration as a 
‘consensual’ dispute resolution mechanism needs to be differentiated and reconciled 
with the jurisdictional side of arbitration”145. In other words, “as it is not fully settled 
whether arbitration is of a contractual, jurisdictional, or mixed nature, one should not 
unduly favor the contractual over the jurisdictional element.146 Despite a certain diffi-
culty in relation to attempt to reverse the conventional thinking that was “managed by 
those who manage it”147 for decades, professor Brekoulakis recently made a kind of 
revolution in orthodoxy settled arbitration community by representation a concept of 
dispute (in contrast to the issue of consent), that, in fact, might be, quite promising 
solution of a great practical value. 
The cited phrase of Alice clearly describes the intention of proposal in the sense that 
for decades we were talking about “ghost” of consent through application of contract 
theories but which, in fact, is absent. Rather, these theories, in the absence of an ad-
equate reasoning, were as a virtual reality of wishful thinking. “Indeed the main pur-
pose of non-signatory theories is: to presume or at least facilitate the deduction of 
consent. For example, in the context of the group of companies doctrine, it can be 
enough for a party to prove that several companies constitute an “economic unit” and 
that the non-signatory company has taken an “active role in the negotiation or the 
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performance of the contract containing the arbitration agreement” for the tribunal to 
presume the “common will of the parties to arbitrate”. In some cases, non-signatory 
theories have gone as far as to suggest that mere awareness of the existence of an 
arbitration clause will be sufficient for a party to be bound by it.”148 
To be more precise, Brekoulakis considers the first set of theories149  as “clear equi-
ty”, whereas the second set150 of theories on the ground of  “… no evidence for arbi-
tration consent is needed“, and with regard to the fact that arbitration is “an autono-
mous legal field with a distinct jurisdictional nature and purpose”;  these legal theo-
ries “in reality amount to “legal fictions” and (as a rule), with absence of consent for 
arbitration; and therefore, in his view such a new “approach would require to focus 
not on putative consent of non-signatories, but on the boundaries of the 
pute151...And the scope of the original arbitration clause” without necessity to main-
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tain any new theory or legal method in this regard152 that, as a matter of fact, allows 
tribunals to assume  jurisdiction over non-signatories based on the fact that the non-
signatory claim is a part of  the dispute before tribunal and such a claim, that is most 
important, falls within the scope of the arbitration clause. To this point, “a widely 
drafted arbitration agreement may allow “any or all disputes” “in connection with the 
contract” to be determined by an arbitral tribunal. It follows that whether a tribunal 
has jurisdiction to determine a dispute involving a non-signatory will depend on 
whether the tribunal, with the power of competence-competence, finds that such a 
dispute is “connected with the contract”.”153 By contrast, as it seems, in the case of 
narrow (more precisely) formulation of the ratione personae of the arbitration agree-
ment, the “link test” is just a matter of technique of interpretation. For instance,  in 
case Lindemann v. Hume, 204 Cal. App. 4th 556 (2012)154, “Because the agreement 
only covered disputes between Cage and the plaintiff, not Cage and his agents, the 
court of appeal denied Cage’s motions to compel arbitration against the plaintiff and 
cross-defendants.”155  
As we may see, it sounds quite simple, clear and practical, without any influence of 
the  contractual quest for amorphous consent in its myriad  forms that in a way corre-
sponds with the mentioned proposal of professor Capper who proposed “...to re-
classify arbitration as a biome...that defies history and geography, in the hope that 
we will (eventually) identify what is the true unity of essence...”156and “which is not 
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rooted for all purposes in consensual agreement”157 and that, for instance, is crystal 
clear for French in the sense that latter consider arbitrator “comme juge”, holding that 
“the moment you have the transmission of the mandate, you have already given up a 
great deal of the parties autonomy to the tribunal which have its power to arbi-
trate”158. Moreover, the technical execution of the concept of dispute, in this respect, 
seems to be relatively unproblematic on the ground of powerful arbitration rules, 
which, according to the belief of “Swiss, Belgian and French arbitrators give them 
powers beyond party autonomy”.  
Despite the aggressive criticism159 and possible disadvantages, we must admit that 
the proposed approach is probably the most vital one in the sense that it proposes 
relatively adequate solution to the whole puzzle of the issue by reflecting an indis-
pensable  extent on arbitration evolution regarding the issue of consent, that in the 
end paraphrasing Montesquieu160 proves that the real value of law is in its ability to 
find an effective solution rather than “complex quests for elusive consent, through 
fact patterns and presumptions [..] which compromise the basic principles of contract 
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law and have questionable practicable value”161. However, taking into account the 
substantial difference among jurisdictions as regards justification for extension, the 
only willingness of the arbitration community to go “out of box” thinking will determine 
the dynamics of deliberation in relation to the proposal. To the point, recently 162 
prominent commentators discussed163 as an alternative to maintain the IBA-type 
guidelines on non-signatories. However, due to the fact that the official findings are in 
progress, any comments on this matter are not available at the moment. 
After all, one may wonder is it really important to sign an arbitration agreement? 
What exactly this signature will evidence? Consent? More likely it might show the 
“level of connection” of non-signatories to the substantive contract as a filter in di-
mension to the dispute at stake. 
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IV. Conclusions 
Undoubtedly, arbitration is a consensual “private justice” that aims to render a just 
and an enforceable decision164. While the historical role of arbitration was resolving 
disputes in linear bilateral commercial transactions5  on the ground of contract law, 
recently we have entered into an era of complex jurisdictional issues165 with non-
signatories element, where the sense of the consent to arbitrate has been trans-
formed.  “[T] he law of arbitration cannot ignore these situations [complex arbitra-
tions] which have become the norm in present day international commerce.”166 Arbi-
tration's ancient code has been broken167 and results  in so-called  social engineer-
ing168 decision-making  that  “had to depart… from the black - letter law, strict legal 
rigor and conventional methods… to less focused on the automatic and per se appli-
cation of consent and traditional legal rules”169 to the extent of “creative legalism”. 
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Courts and arbitrators proceed with a highly intellectual modified test in order to un-
ravel the whole puzzle on the ground of set of subjective and objective facts that are 
considered as self-contained evidences through filter of which, in contrast to concept 
of consent, the legal fate of non-signatories will be solved. As a result, “tribunals (and 
courts) reason less in terms of norms (the consent, writing and privity requirements), 
and more in term of effects of extension (or its absence) in the particular case. “Con-
cerns of equity often underlie the reasoning of courts and, even more, of arbitral tri-
bunals.”170 
Such a revolution or more precise, evolution has received mixed reviews: total ignor-
ing, marginalization of consent171, modern approach to consent172 as well as  aban-
doning173 the dogma of consent toward the dimension of concept of dispute174. Tak-
ing into consideration the fact that arbitration itself, in its origin, based on consensus, 
therefore it is not logical to insist on application of contractual tools as regards a non-
signatory involvement.  On the one hand, “There is reason to believe that rationales 
of practicality and equity… are often implicit in the minds of tribunals and courts and 
play a mind-setting role, but are simply part of the unsaid”175, on the other hand,  first-
ly, perhaps the current legal tools in terms of contractual theories simply are not able 
to serve  adequately any more the current demands of the global business world, 
secondly, alternatively, could one assume that such a creative solution, as the apo-
gee of justice, is mere fair and just  due to the absence of consent as such. In other 
words, one reasonable person would wonder whether it would be more intelligent 
and reasonable, from the perspective of global arbitration, to name “whatever” in 
terms of consent only because of “elementary” static doctrine that is not able to “ac-
cept” the fact of development. Rather, it looks like an act of surrendering. However, 
we cannot run or hide from reality. Everything that is important to arbitration is 
influenced by its main “engine”- clients (i.e.public and private actors). The only way to 
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protect the interest of clients (as non-signatories are among them as well) and value 
of arbitration, as contemporary forum for dispute resolution, is to be active and 
engaged in dialogue.  
Therefore, bear in mind the complexity of current business transactions and its reflec-
tion in the decision-making process via “creative” (regarding consent) reasoning, that 
is prima facie evidence of the evolution of arbitration in general, the idea of a modern 
approach of Hanotiau and its more intellectual and objective expression by 
Brekoulakis, in terms of concept of dispute, is a reasonable explanation in terms of a 
solution to non-signatory dilemma in particular. 
Moreover, as rightly pointed out by Gaillard that “In international arbitration… con-
cepts become reality when they shape the way in which the players… comprehend a 
situation,” mentioned approaches are not an invention, rather an objective analysis of 
the current trends in relationships arbitrators-clients and their influence on each oth-
er, therefore, this is a reality. The reality of dispute between those true parties which 
have the objectively significant connection to the dispute. To rephrase, parties would 
not be true if they could not be in touch with a contract that predetermine from the 
beginning the will of the parties to arbitrate in terms of scope and a subject matter. 
Therefore, main question relates not to the “enough consent”, but rather to whether 
and how “significant” non-signatories are connected to the dispute at hand. To put 
differently, referring to the proponents' critique of the orthodox school, one may won-
der whether it would be legally efficient if not destructive (in terms of constant devel-
opment of arbitration as a universal forum for disputes) to continue a permanent dis-
pute as to the adequate remedies to the problem of non-signatories. In other words, 
upon a legal will in the sense of reluctance to face the new reality merely anything 
could be named as consent, when it is absent. In a word, it reminds me of a tale "The 
Emperor’s New Clothes" by H.Ch. Andersen in terms of “blind” appreciation of illusive 
consent and thereby the negation of the real realm of  facts as a “tribute” to  the Em-
peror ( i.e. traditional view). 
Regarding the approach of dispute, it is fair to speak not about negation of consent, 
but, on the contrary, it is a crucial factor that delimits the borders of the dispute in-
cluding subject matter and involving actors. In other words, the composition of the 
arbitration agreement, from the beginning, defines the breadth of the possible dis-
pute, which, respectively, predetermines sufficiency of the connection between par-
ties and non-signatories to arbitrate. Put simply, the will of the parties of the main 
contract predetermines the legal fate of a (possible) non-signatory to arbitrate. That is 
why the application of theories suffers to find an implied (in fact illusive) consent that 
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normally is absent as the only a level of connection factor between parties and non-
signatories is a predominant condition to open the gate. In this regard the correct in-
terpretation of the context and scope of the arbitration agreement is of high im-
portance. Importantly, consent as the rule of the arbitration remains in its position,  
however, the proposal lies in the intent to maintain a practical and an adequate algo-
rithm to consider the issue of non-signatories through the filter of dispute  (in terms of 
arbitration agreement) as a consequence of the consent between parties to the main 
contract. 
However, at this particular point commentators reproach that the balance between 
legal certainty and legal flexibility is jeopardized in the sense that on the one hand, 
arbitration as a specific legal system is able “to serve” clients need, but on the other 
hand, the procedural imperfection of such a “service” in terms of unpredictability176 
simply repel clients and arbitrators alike. Nonetheless, we must admit that the above 
arguments are unfounded in the sense that such limited standpoint simply disregard 
the current legal chaos due to “existent normative jungle of applicable contractual 
theories in terms of constant change and modification.177To this end, the current situ-
ation seems more risky as to the perspective of arbitration to be trusted by users ra-
ther than attempt to upgrade it. In other words, ”arbitration has to be responsive to 
the free market…, (otherwise) it will disappear”.178 However, one may object that in 
any case, “the efficiency or any other reason cannot be used… without limits, putting 
in danger… justice” in the sense that “the further one gets from… consent, the slim-
mer the change are that award will fare well after being rendered”179 (in terms of ap-
plication  of New York Convention). Nonetheless, the issue is how to deal with the 
current “context”, rather than elaborate on the unreasonable, in this regard, amend-
ments to the New York Convention. Moreover, such reluctant attitude, that can be 
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described by adage “if it ain't broke, don't fix it” has a destructive influence and simply 
does not contribute to the inevitable evolution of the arbitration. In other words, such 
resistance continues the perpetual quest. 
Although the proposed solutions“ cannot be… (justified) by popular opinion or be 
judged from a few cases180  automatically, however,  the imperfect, but practically 
adequate legal method  is more preferable rather than magic (illusive consent) in 
terms of “juristic chemistry”181. Therefore, in order to avoid the destructive legal crea-
tivity that results in an unpredictable metamorphosis of decision making, perhaps, the 
IBA-type guidelines182 on non-signatories as a combination of “the best of two 
worlds”183could be, at least in a test-regime, a first practical  step towards formal 
recognition of concept of dispute in a foreseen future. 
All in all, despite the strong criticism and skepticism, it is truly hoped that the present 
discussion will contribute to a better understanding of the need to re-think the con-
ventional approach to the jurisdictional aspects of arbitration on its way of transfor-
mation to “the best forum” for dispute resolution. In this respect, Sophocles, a great 
Greek poet said: “One must wait until the evening to see how splendid the day has 
been”, therefore, it is just a matter of time. 
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